

supreme leader. From 1949 till his death in 1976, Mao Zhe Dong was the undisputed leader of the PRC, and the chief architect of China's foreign policy.)

Foreign Policy of China Under Mao Zhe Dong (1949-76)

Mao's revolutionary background and faith in socialism influenced his foreign policy agenda. America's assistance to the Kuomintang regime during the civil war in China, and later in Taiwan, led him to locate the US as an adversary. He believed that after the Second World War, when European imperialism had taken a backseat, the Americans had assumed the role of a neo-imperialist and a neocolonialist. Mao's PRC was very critical of the American role in Taiwan and in other parts of the world, where the US was allegedly trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of states through economic and security assistance. American interference in the Korean War in 1950 angered Mao, and China's relations with the US plunged to an abysmal low after the Korean War. At various times in his leadership, Mao openly labelled the US as an imperial and neocolonial power. Understandably, China's relations with the US were much strained from the beginning. Mao was also sceptical about other Western European powers like Britain, France, West Germany and Italy for their perceived anti-communist ideological positions. As a committed person to socialist ideologies, Mao was deeply resentful of the West Bloc, and almost turned China away from the Western world. China thus had very little relationship with the West European states, which were viewed as harbingers of capitalism and agents of the US by Mao and his PRC. So China's relations with the US and other Western powers were very cold and distant during the Mao era.

Mao's PRC went on a bonhomie with the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world, a superpower and a supporter of the Chinese communists during China's civil war and thereafter. Ideological proximity and material support brought the Soviet Union closer to China. Moscow gave huge economic and technological assistance to China after 1949, when the state-building process was going on in full swing. China was creating its industrial and transport infrastructure with Soviet assistance during this time. But the Soviet-China proximity did not last long, as differences emerged from the mid-1950s, overtly on the issue of transfer of poor Soviet technology to China, but covertly over the broader issue of leadership of the Socialist bloc. The Sino-Soviet rift became very pronounced by the early 1960s as both China and the Soviet Union accused each other to be a 'social imperialist'. China strongly condemned the Soviet role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The same year, the two countries levelled charges of illegal occupation of territories around their borders against each other. China also severely criticized the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to curb a popular movement against the communist government. From the mid-1960s, China tried to be close to the East Bloc countries, only to arouse further Soviet suspicion. The Soviet Union viewed this Chinese zeal as designs to curb the Soviet influence in the East Bloc countries. However, China was able to develop close relationship with Albania by the mid-1960s. An angry Soviet Union stopped economic and technological assistance to Albania as a retaliatory measure. The Sino-Soviet rift continued throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, as both the socialist countries tried to provide leadership to other socialist states during this period, and viewed the other with suspicion and mistrust. US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972 further fuelled the suspicion. Soviet leaders alleged that China was trying to build an unholy nexus with the US to marginalize the Soviet Union in international politics. China's relations with the socialist superpower were thus mostly adversarial in Mao's time.

Mao's China provided support to the anti-colonial struggle in the developing states with the desire to become the leader in those states. For this purpose, China supported the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and participated in the Bandung Conference in 1955 that formally created the NAM. China also became friendly with India, and the two big countries of Asia went along well for some time. But from the late 1950s, border disputes and the issue of Tibet created serious differences between the two countries which ultimately led to the 1962 Indo-China war. During the initial years after the formation of the NAM in 1955, China was keen on becoming a leading nation in the NAM. But differences with India—and later with Indonesia—and the broader issue of leadership of the Socialist bloc refrained Mao from taking very active interest in the NAM. Instead, China concentrated on building good relations with some other Asian states like Burma (now Myanmar), Nepal, and Pakistan. Foreign policy analysts in India viewed this Chinese move with suspicion, a latent design to isolate India and strengthen anti-India sentiments in these countries. However, China's efforts to become a leader of the third world failed, as it could not take leadership in the NAM, and as it developed acrimonious relations with many third-world countries.

After 1965, China's relations with Indonesia and many other countries in Africa and Latin America deteriorated. Indonesian President Suharto alleged that China was instigating the communists in Indonesia with a view to create internal disturbances in the country. Suharto severed diplomatic relations with China. Three African states, Burundi, Ghana, and Central African Republic, cut off diplomatic relations with China in 1965–66. Kenya also condemned the aggressive 'socialist imperialism' of China during this time. Mao's China also failed to develop close connections with the developing countries of Latin America. It tried to woo Cuba to come out of Soviet influence by condemning Soviet role in the Cuban Missile Crisis; but Fidel Castro, the supreme leader of Cuba, remained committed to the Soviet Union during and after the crisis. China's aim to lead the third world against the 'imperialistic' policies of the two superpowers was not realized, as Mao's China got estranged from several third world countries.

Viewed from an objective standpoint, Mao's foreign policy was not very successful. He isolated both the superpowers and developed adversarial relations with them. With important states of the third world like India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia (all leaders of the NAM), Mao's China developed very antagonistic relations. China also remained isolated from the industrially developed Western European countries due to Mao's apathy for these 'capitalist', formerly colonial powers. Mao, who was supposed to develop cordial relations with the poor states for his support to the anti-colonial freedom struggle in poor countries, also isolated poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Soviet influence over East Europe was a deterrent for Mao to make any significant impact in East Europe, although he tried and succeeded to establish close links with one or two smaller states in the region. But he failed to bring them out of the Soviet ring. The ideological underpinning of Mao's foreign policy, to avoid the 'colonial' and 'imperial' powers, did not help China economically or politically, as China got estranged from the industrially developed US and the West. The confusion in Mao's foreign policy was manifested further when China got entangled in bitter rivalries with a 'socialist' Soviet Union, and 'nonaligned' India and Indonesia, and other developing countries of the third world with whom Mao's ideology should have gone well. Instead, Mao's China was soon termed as politically ambitious, with an eye to leadership in the socialist bloc, and the third world. This China aroused suspicion in the world, and as a consequence, failed to win friends. During Mao's tenure, China remained largely estranged in international relations.

China's Foreign Policy After Mao (1977-91)

China's foreign policy during the Cold War years could be classified mainly into two parts: first, the Mao era (1949-76); and second, the Deng era (1978-97). This proposition clearly refers to the fact that after the death of Mao Zhe Dong, China's domestic and foreign policies were controlled by another supreme leader, Deng Xiao Ping. Although Deng officially assumed leadership in 1978, succeeding Hua Guo Feng, who took over leadership for a very short period (1976-78) after Mao's death, Deng's rise in Chinese politics could be noticed from 1977. From 1977 till his death in 1997, Deng Xiao Ping remained the most prominent figure in Chinese politics. Consequently, Chinese foreign policy was also controlled by Deng during this period. He made significant departures from Mao's policies, both in domestic and international spheres. Mao's foreign policy was loaded with ideological issues like distance from the 'capitalist' and 'imperialist' states, spreading the message of socialism, supporting 'revolutionary' communist and nationalist movements around the world. Deng's foreign and domestic policies were considered more pragmatic than ideological. Deng was the architect of economic reforms in China which opened hitherto closed Chinese doors to the industrially developed Western world. Chinese economic reforms helped Deng to pursue a more realistic and internationally acceptable foreign policy.

Deng realized that it would not help China much to isolate both the US and the Soviet Union simultaneously. For China's economic development, the US, Western European states and an industrially developed Japan were crucial and more welcome than the socialist rival, the Soviet Union. China could no longer afford to ignore the Western states as 'capitalist' and 'imperialist' powers. In 1979, Deng's China established diplomatic relations with the US. Apart from economic interests, a common adversary (the Soviet Union) also brought China and the US closer. American President Richard Nixon tried to break the ice in Sino-American relations by visiting China in 1972. But differences between the two nations persisted over Taiwan—which China claimed as its territory but the US considered as a sovereign independent country—and Mao's label on the US as an 'imperialist' power. Therefore, Sino-American relations continued to be indifferent during the Mao period. It was Deng who broke real grounds to establish closer links with the US and other developed states of the West.

Deng used economic diplomacy to attract these states towards China. In 1979, China opened up its economy, allowing private business to proliferate and foreign investment to come. Deng made a very new experiment for China. He retained Communist Party's control over Chinese politics and the state, but transformed Chinese economy into a liberal market economy. A new Chinese Constitution was introduced in 1982 to facilitate liberal economic developments in China. Deng's China created Special Economic Zones (SEZ), mainly in the coastal areas, to give special privileges to foreign investors. Now, the industrially advanced states, apathetic to China for long for its 'closed door' policies, felt encouraged and got attracted to China. The socialist market economy (SME) that Deng introduced in China was a new model in international politics and economy. It retained one-party control in Chinese politics and society, but allowed deregulation of the economy. Although there were initial schisms about the SME, it gradually proved to be a huge success and made Deng, the conservative pragmatist, the undisputed leader of modern China.

Deng's foreign policy, must, therefore, be analysed in the context of the SME and his conservative pragmatism. The success of the state-controlled liberal economy in China, manifested through

its economic growth rate made China a very attractive destination for foreign investments. American, Japanese and west European private business started to enter China in a big way from the early 1980s, paving ways for the relegation of political differences to the background. China's annual average economic growth rate for the decade 1960-70 was 5.2, and for 1970-80 it was 5.5. During the next decade (1980-90), when SME was operating, China's annual growth rate rose to a staggering 10.3, almost double the average growth rate of the earlier two decades (source: International Monetary Fund). Therefore, Deng's China was economically stronger than Mao's China, and it was easier for an economically open and strong China to conduct international relations with more determination, zeal and success. As China shed its ideological bias to invite foreign investments from the 'capitalist' and 'imperialist' states of the West, these industrially developed nations also changed their views about a 'rigid' and 'closed' socialist state in Asia. Gradually China's relations with the Western world improved, as China began to play, from the early 1980s, a significant role in mainstream international economics and politics. Mao's China also wanted to play a major role in world politics, but could not fulfill its desires due to China's closed economy and adverse international relations; but Deng's China, economically open and strong, could play this desired role more easily, as China became more acceptable to the rest of the world.

China's relations with the Soviet Union also improved after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1985. Border trade between the two socialist giants went up and got strengthened by the late 1980s. Gorbachev paid an official visit to China in May 1989. Before his visit, the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of 5,00,000 Soviet troops from its borders with China. Chinese leaders welcomed this Soviet gesture. In 1990, Li Peng, Prime Minister of China, visited the Soviet Union. A ten-year vision on close cooperation in trade, economic and technological areas between the two countries was announced during Peng's visit. With 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' taking shape, the Soviet Union also opened up and shed its earlier hostility towards China. As a consequence, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve. Deng also reached out to third world countries, including India, to assess possibilities of improved trade and commerce. By the early 1990s, when Cold War was nearing its end, China secured its place in the international order as a rapidly growing economy, a strong military, and a more open state with a realistic view of the world. China's journey towards a major power status continued after the end of the Cold War.

China's Foreign Policy After the Cold War

China maintained its spectacular economic growth after the Cold War and continued to use economic diplomacy as its major thrust in international relations. Although an ageing Deng Xiaoping resigned from all official posts in 1991, he remained as the central figure in Chinese politics, and virtually controlled the party and the state in China till his death in 1997. The SME brought economic gains for China, which subsequently helped China in conducting international diplomacy more effectively. After the Cold War, the US remained the only superpower in an altered international order. Deng's pragmatic China wanted to be close to the world's only remaining superpower. The US also wanted to forge strong economic relations with China because of its emerging market. Mutual interests brought these two countries close after the Cold War. In 1994, the US granted the 'Most Favoured Nation (MFN) in Trade' status to China. Despite persistent criticism in the US Congress about human rights violations in China, the US did not

hesitate to grant MFN status to China for trade and economic interests. By 1998–99, China became the fourth largest trading partner of the US with bilateral trade reaching US \$94.9 billion at the end of 1999. Sino-US two-way trade was only US \$2.4 billion in 1979.

In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), backed heavily by the US. Since then, it has become a major player in the WTO, supporting interests of the developing states. Sino-US trade continued to escalate in the new century as well. Two-way trade reached a substantial US \$409.2 billion in 2008.¹¹ The US emerged as the top trading partner of China in 2008 and 2009, with Japan emerging as the second largest trading partner in 2009. These data revealed how China had used its economic diplomacy after the Cold War to bring former adversaries close towards China. Despite occasional American concern for an authoritarian political system, and violation of democratic and human rights in China, the US–China economic relations remained very strong after the Cold War, and these would continue to remain strong in the future for mutual trade and business interests. Strengthened economic relations also helped Sino-American political relations to improve after the Cold War. Top-level mutual visits by the leaders of the two nations continued after the war. American President Barack Obama visited China in November 2009. The US–China joint statement issued during Obama's visit acknowledged China's leading role in world politics, and particularly in Asia. The statement, which raised eyebrows in India, clearly indicated that China occupied a dominant role in Asia. It appeared to highlight the new Democratic Administration's preference for China. This preference may also strengthen US–China political relations in future.

With Gorbachev becoming the President of the Soviet Union, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve. China's relations with the new Russian Federation continued to grow after the Cold War. In 1991, the Sino-Russian Border Agreement was signed apportioning territory that became controversial during the Sino-Soviet border conflict during the Cold War period. In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited China, and signed economic and defence agreements with China. After Gorbachev's visit to China in 1989, leaders of the two states continued to pay mutual visits. These top-level visits helped to normalize relations between the two countries. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited China in 2000, and signed three important economic and trade agreements with China. In 2001, Russia emerged as the top supplier of defence equipments to China. Also in 2001, the close relations between the two countries were formalized with the 'Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation', a twenty-year strategic, economic, and arguably, an implicit military, treaty. Before this treaty was signed, the two countries joined Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral forum for economic and strategic cooperation.

The Russian government also agreed to transfer Tarabarov Island as well as one half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island to China in 2004, ending a long-standing border dispute between the two countries. The transfer had been ratified by both the Chinese and the Russian parliaments. The official transfer ceremony was held on 14 October 2008. This event was a big leap forward in bilateral relationship between China and Russia, and could act as a confidence-building measure in the future. Two-way trade between the two countries also registered significant growth in recent times. Sino-Russian trade volume was US \$33.4 billion in 2006. It reached a healthy US \$56.8 billion in 2008. During his visit to Russia in 2007, Chinese President Hu Jin Tao told Russian journalists that he was very optimistic about bilateral trade reaching US \$80 billion by 2010.¹² Russian President Dimitry Medvedev also expressed similar hopes during his state visit to China in 2008.¹³ Although the total volume of present China–Russia trade is not as

unquestioned authority.⁵⁶ The PLA still holds sway in these and other defence-related foreign policy issues, particularly with respect to policies related to strategic arms, territorial disputes and national security towards countries such as India, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the USA.⁵⁷ In particular, the PLA is a staunch advocate of a hard line towards Taiwan and perceived US interference in cross-strait relations.⁵⁸

As the highest CPC body overseeing defence policy and military strategy, the Central Military Commission is responsible for the unified command of the Chinese armed forces. It remains an important channel for PLA influence on foreign policy.⁵⁹ Meetings of the entire CMC, held on average six times per year and lasting for several days, are the most significant institutionalized interaction the PLA has with China's supreme leader (who in recent history has also usually been the CMC chairman). Hu Jintao is presently the only civilian on the 11-member commission.⁶⁰ While the CMC, like the PLA as a whole, has historically been dominated by the ground forces, in 2002 the air force, navy and Second Artillery Corps (China's strategic missile forces) were each given CMC representation.⁶¹ This reflected their elevated status and their role in foreign policy formulation as the PLA branches responsible for new or enhanced military capabilities and strategic programmes, including anti-satellite and ballistic missile defence tests and over-seas naval deployments.⁶²

In addition to the CMC, the PLA can also insert itself into foreign policy decision-making processes via the LSGs, although its effectiveness in these groups is questionable. While the PLA presence in the FALSG and the TALSG is as large as that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MFA representatives out-rank the military in both bodies.⁶³ On the FALSG the military is presumed to be represented by the minister of national defence and a PLA deputy chief of staff, and on the TALSG by a PLA deputy chief of staff.⁶⁴ The extent to which the

⁵⁶ Gill, B., 'Two steps forward, one step back: the dynamics of Chinese nonproliferation and arms control policy-making in an era of reform', ed. D. M. Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 2001), pp. 257-88.

⁵⁷ Senior PLA official (note 55); and Mid-level PLA official, 12 May 2010 (note 50).

⁵⁸ See e.g. Luo, Y. (罗援), '在台湾问题上我们不能高枕无忧' [We should not rest without worries on Taiwan issue], 中国选举与治理网 [China Election and Governance], 25 Nov. 2009, <<http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=161914>>.

⁵⁹ On the CMC see Li, N., 'The Central Military Commission and military policy in China', eds J. C. Mulvenon and A. N. D. Yang, *The People's Liberation Army as Organization* (RAND: Santa Monica, CA, 2002), pp. 45-94.

⁶⁰ Officially, both the CPC and the government have their own CMCs, although the memberships are identical. For further discussion of the CMC see Shanbaugh, D., *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (University of California Press: Berkeley, CA, 2002), pp. 110-24.

⁶¹ 'CPC Central Military Commission', China Vitae, <<http://www.chinavitae.com/library/>>.

⁶² China's Jan. 2007 anti-satellite test ran counter to its historical advocacy of an international ban on space weapons. The Dec. 2008 deployment of naval vessels to participate in international anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden initiated a process that has stretched China's interpretation of non-interference, one of its long-standing foreign policy pillars.

⁶³ On the FALSG, while both Dai Bingguo and Liang Guanglie are state councillors, Dai is also secretary general of the FALSG and head of the Foreign Affairs Office.

⁶⁴ The PLA reportedly succeeded in placing a CMC vice-chairman on the TALSG from 2000 to 2008 but then lost its second and more prestigious seat for reasons that remain unclear. Early attempts to upgrade the PLA's TALSG representation are noted in Cheung, T. M., 'The influence of the gun: China's Central Military

minister of national defence fully represents the PLA is questionable, given that the current minister is only a rank-and-file CMC member, unlike past ministers who served as vice-chairmen. In addition, he leads a largely symbolic organization that is tasked with formal interaction with the ministry's foreign counterparts and coordination of defence-related policy with other government entities. The deputy chief of staff would rank below the Politburo members, state councilors and ministers (which make up a substantial portion of the body), complicating his task of defending PLA interests.

Substantial portions of PLA views are transmitted to civilian leaders via internal, non-public channels. The National Defence University and the Academy of Military Science, which are represented on the CMC, submit reports directly to the military leadership. Organizations and individuals in the services and general departments—particularly the staff of research institutions, PLA journalists and other officers—file reports intended for the CMC through their chain of command or publish articles in PLA publications. The CMC General Office's research arm, which collects information for the CMC, can also directly commission reports or make policy suggestions of its own.⁶⁵ An officer can also send a policy memo directly to the civilian leadership—an audacious move that can occasionally lead to a rare face-to-face meeting with top political leaders.⁶⁶ Public advocacy and direct appeal to top leaders are risky tactics, however. If the proposal in question is poorly received by senior officials, the author faces possible rejection and, in some cases, punishment—including denial of permission for public presentations or travel abroad.⁶⁷

Professionalization of the PLA has neither led to a reluctance on the part of military officers to become involved in public foreign policy debates nor resulted in the emergence of a monolithic PLA pressure group on Chinese foreign policy issues.⁶⁸ On the contrary, in recent years the PLA has increasingly tried to influence the public debate about national security issues by publicly disseminating analysis by PLA research institutions as well as allowing officers to write divergent commentaries in prominent newspapers and serve as television commentators. Despite this, PLA servicemen are not allowed to maintain their own Internet blogs.⁶⁹ The PLA has also actively cultivated relationships with civilian researchers by allowing officers to participate in debates at civilian research institutions and inviting civilian researchers to lecture at and take part in PLA workshops.⁷⁰

Commission and its relationship with the military, party, and state decision-making systems', ed. Lampton (note 56), p. 67.

⁶⁵ Li (note 59).

⁶⁶ Senior PLA official (note 55).

⁶⁷ According to a senior PLA official, both military and political leaders disapproved of 'emotional outbursts' in the media by PLA officers in recent years. The official expected such behaviour to be curtailed. Senior PLA official (note 55).

⁶⁸ For a discussion of these predictions see Mulvenon, J. C., *Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications* (RAND: Santa Monica, CA, 1997), pp. 76–77.

⁶⁹ See '战友，请删除你的博客' [Serviceman, please delete your blog], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], 25 June 2010.

⁷⁰ Senior PLA official (note 55); and Mid-level PLA official, 12 May 2010 (note 50).

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In May 2009 Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University noted the importance of the PLA, or as he called them 'guys in uniform', when he listed three types of new foreign policy actors: netizens (*wangmin*), shareholders (*gumin*) and the military (*junmin*).⁷¹ In a follow-up research interview, Jin explained that, although the PLA has always been an actor in foreign policy deliberations in China, he considers them a 'new' actor because of the transformation of the PLA in recent years to a more professional military and because of the PLA's increasing contacts and cooperation with the outside world. The combined effect of professionalism and international contact has somewhat de-emphasized the ideological outlook of the PLA. As a result, Jin envisions the PLA adopting new perceptions of Chinese national interests and viewing itself as the final guarantor of those national interests. He expects the mindset of the military to develop along a dual-track trajectory with regard to national interests: one track that becomes more nationalistic and another that becomes more willing to engage in international cooperation and dialogue.⁷² The PLA's interactions with foreign militaries has enabled China to emphasize the peaceful nature of its development and also at times to express China's displeasure with the policies of other countries, notably by cancelling military-to-military contacts with the USA.⁷³

Two PLA officers and a senior researcher who is consulted regularly by government officials disagree with Jin's description of the PLA as a new foreign policy actor, saying that the PLA still considers itself an integral part of the Communist Party.⁷⁴ Top military leaders are political appointees who must follow the Party line, and the prime mission of the PLA is to protect the Party.⁷⁵ In his internal discussions with policymakers, the senior researcher had advocated that the PLA be transformed into a national army and that its prime mission be to protect the interests of Chinese citizens. However, the two PLA officers said that such a vision would not materialize as long as the CPC was in power.⁷⁶

As China's integration in the international community has intensified, it has become increasingly imperative for Chinese authorities to swiftly communicate with the outside world in crisis situations. At the same time, as the PLA's role in foreign policy evolves, concerns have arisen about its willingness to communicate fully with the civilian leadership.⁷⁷ On several occasions over the past decade the PLA has initiated, escalated or delayed tense international situations

⁷¹ Jin, C., Presentation at the launch event of the SIPRI China and Global Security Programme, Stockholm, 8 May 2009.

⁷² Jin, C., Interview with author, Beijing, 7 Sep. 2009.

⁷³ The PLA has engaged in extensive military-to-military diplomacy with, among others, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. China has repeatedly cut off such relations with the USA in protest at arms sales to Taiwan. See Minnick, W., 'At Shangri-La dialogue, Gates challenges China to improve military relations', *Defense News*, 7 June 2010.

⁷⁴ Active duty PLA officer, Interview with author, Langfang, 18 Sep. 2009; Senior PLA official (note 55); and Senior researcher/government consultant, Interview with author, Beijing, 19 Sep. 2009.

⁷⁵ The first of the PLA's 4 'new historic missions' assigned by Hu Jintao is to 'provide critical, powerful backing for the Party's consolidation of its ruling status'. Hu, J., '认清新世纪新阶段我军历史使命' [Recognizing the PLA's new historic missions in a new century and era], Speech before the Central Military Commission, 24 Dec. 2004. The transcript of the original speech was not officially published.

⁷⁶ Senior PLA official (note 55); and Active duty PLA officer (note 74), 20 Apr. 2010.

⁷⁷ For a discussion of interactions between the state and the PLA in times of crisis see Li (note 53).

3. Upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

The five principles of peaceful coexistence was put forward in line with the reality of a multipolar world. Respect to sovereignty is the most fundamental principle in a new type of international relations among countries. Mutual non-aggression means to get rid of the threat of using arms and armed threat in the international affairs and prevent any other country from interfering with any means. Equality and mutual benefit mean political equality, economic equality, cooperation, mutual benefit and supplement to each other's needs. Peaceful coexistence calls on all countries to seek common interests, reserve differences, respect each other, maintain friendly cooperation and live in harmony regardless of differences in their social systems and ideologies. In the 1990s great changes have occurred in the world. Domination of two superpowers ended and the world is becoming more multipolar. On the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, China stands for the establishment of a peaceful, stable, just and rational international order. China's stand conforms to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and reflects the trend of the times to seek peace and development.

4. Strengthening Solidarity of the Developing Countries, and Together Opposing Imperialism and Colonialism

It is a great cause of the people in the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that account for three-quarters of the total population of the world, to take the road of independence and development. China has constantly held that supporting the just demands of the developing countries and safeguarding solidarity and cooperation among the developing countries is its international duty. Whenever the developing countries suffer external aggression and interference, China is ready to give its support. Many leaders of the developing countries regard China as a "tested friend" and a "reliable friend". China has become a formal observer of the nonalignment movement, and its cooperative relations with the Seventy-Seven Group and the South Pacific Forum has been steadily strengthened.

5. Improving Relations with Developed Countries to Promote Common Progress

On the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence, China has constantly stood for establishing and developing relations with developed countries, and regarded improving the relations with developed countries and promoting development with them as an important task of China's foreign affairs.

The establishment of the diplomatic relations with France in 1964 broke the policy of Western countries to isolate China. In the 1970s the world situation experienced a great change, the United States had to readjust its policy on China, and China also readjusted its policy on the United States. This resulted in a breakthrough of the long antagonism between China and the United State, and the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries through common efforts. Meanwhile, China established diplomatic relations and strengthened friendly cooperative ties with other Western countries successively. This further brought about a new situation in China's foreign affairs.

6. Removing External Interference, Promoting China's Reunification

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Hong Kong and Macao have been inseparable parts of China since ancient times. China does not recognize unequal treaties imposed by imperialist powers. Regarding the issue of Hong Kong and Macao left over by history, China has constantly held the position of peaceful settlement through negotiations at a proper opportunity.

In order to accomplish China's reunification, Deng Xiaoping put forward the concept of "one country, two systems". The delegations of the Chinese and British governments finally reached an agreement after 22 rounds of talks, and formally signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and three appendixes. Hong Kong returned to the embrace of the motherland on July 1, 1997. The Chinese and Portugal governments formally signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao and two appendixes in 1984 after they reached an agreement through four-round talks. China will resume its exercise of sovereignty over Macao on December 20, 1999.

Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. People of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are looking forward to the realization of China's reunification. China resolutely opposes the "independence of Taiwan", the attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". Chinese leaders call on Taiwan authorities to enter into political negotiations with the mainland at an early date. On the premise that there is only one China, the two sides of the Straits should end the state of hostility, and improve the relations between the two sides to accomplish the reunification of the motherland.

The international situation is experiencing a great change, and peace and development have become the mainstream of the time. China will continue to adhere to the independent and peaceful foreign policy and to make greater contribution to the cause of safeguarding world peace and promoting human progress, and to building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

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Basic Principles of China's Foreign Policy

The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) served as the provisional constitution after it was adopted in September 1949. The document clearly stipulated that the basic principle of China's foreign policy was to guarantee independence, freedom and territorial integrity of the state, support protracted world peace and friendly cooperation among peoples of all countries in the world, and oppose imperialist policies of aggression and war. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China revised during the First Plenary Session of the Eighth National People's Congress has the explicit stipulations concerning China's foreign policy: "China adheres to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries; China consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, works to strengthen unity with the people of other countries, supports the oppressed nations and the developing countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence and develop their national economies, and strives to safeguard world peace and promote the cause of human progress." Page 1

Following the above policies over the past 50 years, China has actively engaged in foreign activities, and in handling foreign affairs. China has made sustained efforts to developing friendly cooperative relations with all countries and in safeguarding world peace, and has made its contribution in these fields too.

1. Maintaining Independence and Safeguarding National Sovereignty

China had suffered imperialist aggression and oppression for over 100 years before the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. Therefore, China regards the hard-earned right of independence as the basic principle of foreign policy. China maintains independence, does not allow any country to infringe upon its national sovereignty and interfere in its internal affairs. As to international affairs, China decide on our stand and policy according to whether the matter is right and wrong and in consideration of the basic interests of the Chinese people and the people of the world, and shall never yield to pressure and threat from other countries. China maintains independence, cherishes its own right and also respects for the right of independence of other countries. China upholds that any country, big or small, rich or poor, and strong or weak, should be equal. China maintains independence, will neither enter into alliance with any big power or group of countries, nor establish any military bloc, join in the arms race or seek military expansion.

2. Opposing Hegemonism and Safeguarding World Peace

The common aspiration of the Chinese people as well as the people of the world is to maintain peace and to eliminate wars. After the World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union desperately engaged in arm races and regional domination in order to contend for world hegemonism. As a result, they caused severe threat to world peace. The Chinese government has constantly opposed arm races and regional domination, and actively stood for the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and great reduction of conventional weapons and military troops. China decided in 1985 to reduce one million troops within two years and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1992. All these received favorable international comments.

(whether intentionally or not)—for example, in 2001, after a US reconnaissance plane made an emergency landing on Hainan Island, and in 2007, after the PLA shot down a Chinese weather satellite. Among Western analysts a view has emerged that the PLA withheld critical information during the Hainan crisis in an attempt to pressure the political leadership into taking a forceful stance against the USA.⁷⁸ In 2007, after China's first successful test of an anti-satellite weapon, the government made no comment on the interception for nearly two weeks. While Hu Jintao almost certainly knew about the test in advance, several interviewees and Western observers presume that the delayed official announcement was due to a lack of coordination and communication between the PLA and MFA.⁷⁹ Moreover constant international scrutiny of the PLA's actions tends to cast a shadow on the PLA's intentions, meaning that even minor actions by the PLA have foreign policy consequences.

Within the PLA the weight of the PLAN has increased in tandem with growing recognition of the importance of maritime security by the political leadership. The PLAN has in recent years been party to repeated disputes with Japan, South East Asian countries and the USA over maritime sovereignty in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. For example, in 2009 Chinese vessels that were provoking the US survey ship *Impeccable* came close to instigating a collision in China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). China interprets the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as granting it extensive rights in its EEZ. The USA, on the other hand, recognizes high seas freedom of movement in EEZs.⁸⁰ Such acts have raised tensions between China and the USA.⁸¹ PLAN submarines have also been active outside Chinese waters, illegally entering Japanese territorial waters while submerged in 2004 and repeatedly shadowing US naval ships.⁸² It is unclear whether these cases represent isolated incidents or a deliberate campaign to force the political leadership to take a stand on what the PLA perceives as China's core interests, given how little is known about the Chinese chain of command in military events related to foreign policy.

⁷⁸ Mulvenon, J., 'Civil-military relations and the EP-3 crisis: a content analysis', *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 1 (winter 2002); and Keefe, J., 'A tale of "two very sorries" redux', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 165, no. 11 (21 Mar. 2002), pp. 30–33.

⁷⁹ Senior PLA official (note 55); Swaine, M., 'Assessing the meaning of the Chinese ASAT', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 Feb. 2007, <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/tfa-view&id=19006>>; and Gill, B. and Kleiber, M., 'China's space odyssey: what the antisatellite test reveals about decision-making in Beijing', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 3 (May–June 2007).

⁸⁰ According to the US Department of Defense, 'A civilian crew mans the ship, which operates under the auspices of the Military Sealift Command', Garamone, J., 'Chinese vessels shadow, harass unarmed US survey ship', American Forces Press Service, 9 Mar. 2009, <<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53401>>; and '剖析南海间谍船事件“揭美无限”号真面目', [An analysis of the spy ship incident on South China Sea and the true face of the US 'Impeccable'], 中国评论新闻网 [China Review News], 12 Mar. 2009iv.

⁸¹ Starr, B., 'Chinese boats harassed U.S. ship, officials say', GNN.com, 5 May 2009, <<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/index.html>>; and Macartney, J., 'Chinese and American ships clash again in Yellow Sea', *The Times*, 6 May 2009.

⁸² Curtin, J. S., 'Submarine puts Japan-China ties into a dive', *Asia Times*, 17 Nov. 2004.